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Anton L. Allahar
politics of Ethno-Nationalism:  
A post-Colonial and post-Socialist Schema
(Etnonacionalizmo politika: konceptuali  
postkolonijinė ir postsocialistinė schema)
Santrauka. Šio straipsnio paskirtis – sukonstruoti koncepcinę schemą, kuri leistų nagrinėti šiuolaikinę 
nacionalinio ir etninio tapatumo politiką postkolonialinėse ir postsocialistinėse valstybėse. Siekiama a) pateikti 
supratingą euristinį nacionalizmo apibrėžimą, b) sukonkretinti šį apibrėžimą papildant jį pažyminiu „etni-
nis“, c) įvertinti etninio nacionalizmo sampratos euristinę svarbą siekiant suprasti etniškumo ir nacionalinio 
identiteto politiką valstybėms atgavus nepriklausomybę, d) suprobleminti “klaidinančios sąmonės” sąvoką 
susiejant ją su etnonacionalinės politikos idealų patrauklumo idėja.
1. Introduction: Religion and Ethnic 
Identity
In a world that is increasing ravaged by 
religious and sectarian violence tied to eth-
nic self-determination, the region of Central 
Asia stands out as particularly typical of a 
post-colonial, post-independence one. Ta-
jikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Turkmenistan are all parts of Central 
Asia, which, throughout its early history, was 
heavily influenced by Islamic and Christian 
cultures. Today, however, the ethno-religious 
composition is mainly Muslim and Rus-
sian Orthodox as Kazaks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyzs, 
Kirghizes, Tajiks and Turkmen try to forge 
sovereign nations out of the mess left by the 
former Soviet Union. 
The major tensions in these countries 
revolve around the fact that since their inde-
pendence the standard of living of the people 
has fallen sharply. However, as Qian Zongqi 
(2006) has noted, the biggest threat to the so-
cial order is not to be found in the increasing 
spread of poverty but rather in the growing 
religious extremism of various groups. The 
leaders of those groups responded to the de-
terioration in living standards by attempting 
to mobilize their followers against the govern-
ments in power via ethno-religious appeals. 
At the same time the governments in ques-
tion sought to secularize their societies and to 
separate religious teachings from political and 
state practices. However, the increasing Islam-
ization of regional ethnic political conscious-
ness has not augured well for modernization 
and the secularization of Central Asian states.
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The foregoing is tied to a strong anti-
Russian sentiment and the fact that, as an 
ethnic group, the Russians assumed an air 
of superiority and ever since they set foot in 
Central Asia. That superiority had them look-
ing down on the local groups/inhabitants as 
backward and ignorant. After independence, 
however, the locals in the various Central 
Asian countries have attempted to reassert 
themselves in ethno-national terms and have 
begun to make the Russians aware of the fact 
that they are not exactly welcome. So after the 
Soviet Union disintegrated and after the de-
mise of socialism, the independent countries 
of Central Asia also witnessed the vigorous 
rebirth of religion in the form of Islamic con-
sciousness. 
In Uzbekistan the spread of Islam was 
most rapid, and while religious conscious-
ness is not a threat in itself, in the hands of 
ethnic entrepreneurs (Allahar 2004) it has 
the potential to be. As Qian Zongqi notes, 
“religious propaganda may become the cata-
lyst for social contradictions when the social 
and economic situation worsens.” According 
to this author, in Uzbekistan where the per 
capita monthly income is only $2-$9, poverty 
is grinding, but yet not as bad as it is in Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan. It is therefore not sur-
prising to discover that “Under the circum-
stances, someone sedulously propagandizing 
radical ideas with the aid of religion would 
undoubtedly be pouring oil on fire, and con-
flicts would be intensified” (Ibid). What Qian 
Zongqi is suggesting is that the opening for 
ethnic entrepreneurship is very clear and this 
is a fact that is not lost on religious activists 
and political aspirants (ethnic entrepreneurs) 
from countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 
Iran and Pakistan, who have played a key role 
in the religious renaissance via the funding 
of mosques and religious schools in various 
parts of Central Asia. 
This is the context in which the civil war 
in Tajikistan is to be understood as leading 
to antagonisms with the government of Uz-
bekistan in 1999. Inside Tajikistan extremist 
religious forces sought to oppose all attempts 
at modernization and secularization and 
pushed instead for the promotion of a Islamic 
consciousness. The example of Tajikistan had 
a direct echo in Uzbekistan where the ethnic 
entrepreneurs at the head of the opposition 
Uzbekistan Islamic Movement (UIM) pur-
sued the creation of an Islamic republic and 
engaged in armed conflicts with the govern-
ment forces in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz-
stan. When those conflicts ended with the 
triumph of the Uzbek government the im-
mediate result was a refugee flood of Muslim 
Uzbeks into Tajikistan as relations between 
both countries cooled. Today the economic 
situation has not improved and the situation 
remains quite volatile.
As shall be argued presently, the global 
struggles for ethnic and national self-deter-
mination and sovereignty are closely bound 
up with struggles for identity, and those in 
turn are directly linked to struggles for a 
homeland or a territorial ‘home’ base from 
which to operate. This concern with the land, 
with who owns it and who belongs on it or to 
it, has come to define a huge part of modern 
politics in the global age of physical displace-
ment, diasporic identity, cultural uprooting, 
and the search for belonging. It is about a 
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dual sense of identity and belonging: (a) the 
psychological or individual, and (b) the so-
ciological or group sense. But ‘belonging’ also 
implies boundaries that separate those of the 
in-group from those of the out-group. What 
criteria, then, are employed in setting those 
boundaries? 
It seems to me that one of the clearest 
answers to this question is place of birth: 
where one is born is a vital part of who one is; 
of one’s identity. Thus, the English term ‘na-
tion,’ can be traced directly to the Latin verb 
nasci (to be born). As will be seen, however, 
given my focus on ‘ethnic nationalism’ in the 
modern world, the matter is a great deal more 
complex than this. For example, whereas the 
Greeks have just one word to express this 
combined or compound idea, ethnos, which 
means both ‘ethnic’ and ‘nation,’ other socie-
ties make a definite distinction between the 
two. To elaborate, in Greek the notions of 
ethnicity and nationality are synonymous, 
and such terms as ethnikos (ethnic or na-
tional) and ethnikotis (ethnicity or nationali-
ty), would suggest that the concept of ‘ethnic 
nationalism’ is somewhat redundant. This is 
so because the Greek conception of ethnos 
speaks to the idea of a nation-state or a state 
that comprises a single ethnic group. This is 
obviously very much at odds with most mo-
dern day multiethnic states such as those that 
characterize the Caribbean region, where the 
contested politics of national identity can and 
has assumed ethnic dimensions, and is often 
conducted in competitive and acrimonious 
terms. But it is not necessarily irrelevant to 
the post-socialist states of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia.
To return to the idea of belonging, the 
basic social and gregarious make-up of hu-
man beings is seen to be bound up with 
their above-mentioned search for ‘home.’ It 
is a search that is fuelled by a desire not to 
be left alone, for such aloneness is unnatural 
and leads to feelings of insecurity and vul-
nerability (Allahar 1994:18-21). And this 
is why Benedict Anderson could write 
that, “...nation-ness and nationalism com-
mand such profound emotional legitimacy” 
(1983:13-14). Much like being the member of 
a family, to be rooted in one’s own land im-
plies an unquestioned acceptance by fellows 
and a sense of belonging that is both physi-
cally and emotionally reassuring. Speaking 
specifically about the individual in the group, 
Harold Isaacs wrote:
He is not only not alone, but here, as long as 
he chooses to remain in and of it, he cannot 
be denied or rejected. It is an identity he 
might want to conceal, abandon, or change, 
but it is the identity that no one can take away 
from him. It is home in the sense of Robert 
Frost’s line, the place where, when you’ve got 
to go there, they’ve got to take you in (Isaacs 
1975:43; emphasis in original).
2. The point of departure
This said, the present paper aims to pro-
pose a schema for analysing the contempo-
rary politics of national and ethnic identity 
in post-colonial and post-socialist states. To 
this end it will seek: (a) to provide a compre-
hensive operational definition of nationalism, 
(b) to qualify that definition by the addition 
of the adjective ‘ethnic,’ and (c) to assess the 
extent to which the concept ‘ethnic nationa-
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lism’ can help us to understand some of the 
politics of ethnicity and national identity in 
a post-independence (whether post-colonial 
or post-socialist) setting. My argument will 
be situated within the broad theoretical fra-
mework of a non-reductionist, neo-Marxist 
class analysis, for it is my conviction that et-
hno-national consciousness and politics are 
better understood if we are able to trace the 
concrete class interests and motives of their 
promoters.
To begin, there is so much disagreement 
over the definition and proper meaning of 
‘nationalism’ as a concept, that Ernst Haas 
has questioned why bother even to ask ‘what 
is nationalism and why should we study it’ 
(Haas 1986)? At the very broadest of levels, 
nationalism can be seen as an ideology es-
poused by those who live in already-estab-
lished nations, complete with economic, 
political, legal, military, economic and civic 
autonomy in a clearly demarcated territorial 
space. Thus, the ideology of nationalism can, 
and has been used to rally individuals and 
groups behind the flag of a nation, to give 
them a sense of belonging to that nation, and 
to separate them from others who do not be-
long. But as an ideology, the term nationalism 
can also be used to characterize a sentiment, a 
yearning or movement for independence and 
autonomy on the part peoples, who, though 
sharing what Clifford Geertz calls “a corpora-
te sentiment of oneness” and “a consciousness 
of kind” (1973:260; 307), do not yet inhabit 
a clearly defined territorial space. Therefore, 
nationalist movements are quintessentially 
political movements. And as we have seen 
in the srtugglesof various social and cultu-
ral groups from the former USSR, national 
and cultural identities are neither natural nor 
automatic. As Daniel Chirot writes: “almost 
all the present nations would like to become 
nation-states, but many nations are actually 
parts of other states, and many states are not 
nation-states” (1977:11).
It is this latter phenomenon that inte-
rests me most. For I see the situation as quite 
suggestive of post-colonial and post-socialist 
social formations in areas such as the former 
Soviet Union and the Caribbean, where mul-
ti-ethnic states like those of Russian Fede-
ration and the Caribbean house ‘nations’ in 
search of ‘homes.’ I am thinking of nations as 
ethnic groupings that share the above-men-
tioned “corporate sentiment of oneness,” and 
of homes as places (territories) where the 
members of such groupings can feel a sense of 
unquestioned belonging and acceptance. My 
approach to ‘the nation,’ then, deals as much 
with unwritten sentiment as with juridical 
meaning, and differs somewhat from Antho-
ny Giddens’ strictly state-centered view: 
By a ‘nation’ I refer to a collectivity existing 
within a clearly demarcated territory, which is 
subject to a unitary administration, reflexively 
monitored both by the internal state apparatus 
and those of other states. A ‘nation’ .... only 
exists when a state has a unified administrative 
reach over the territory over which its sovere-
ignty is claimed (Giddens 1984:116).
Whether dealing with capitalist or socia-
list colonialism, colonies and those colonial 
subjects that inhabit them are by defini tion 
not independent or sovereign entities. It is 
72
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2008/2 (22), ISSN 1392-3358 Nacionalizmo sociologija
possible, however, for colonial subjects to 
develop a sense of nation-ness and to agitate 
for independence and national self-determi-
nation while still under the colonizers’ yoke. 
This was clearly the case in the former Soviet 
republics of Georgia and Chechenia, and in 
the English-speaking Caribbean on the eve of 
independence as Crown Colony government 
paved the way for the emergence of nationalist 
politics. However, it is after securing political 
independence, whether by war or by peaceful 
negotiation with the colonial master, that the 
process of nation building can be said to begin. 
But since no two countries are exactly alike 
in their historical experiences, their social 
class structure and composition, their natu-
ral resource endowment, their demographic 
make-up, or even in the specific values that 
their cultures embrace, the process of nation 
building can be expected to vary from coun-
try to country. It stands to reason too, that in 
multiethnic states where two or more ethnic 
groups are more or less even in numbers, the 
process of nation building could be a very 
contentious one. And this is likely to be even 
more accentuated where the ethnic groups in 
question have a developed racialized cons-
ciousness (Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Trinidad 
and Guyana).
Further, in order fully to understand the 
sentiment of nationalism one must look at its 
proponents and interrogate their motives. In 
other words, whether as sentiment or as mo-
vement, nationalism cannot be divorced from 
the class and political interests of its leading 
promoters. By this I mean that nationalism, 
along with the peculiar brands of ideological 
appeal that nationalists make, will most often 
be linked to the discrete economic and poli-
tical interests of its champions. But one must 
be cautious in absolutizing the class claim, 
for in the specific case of ethnic nationalism, 
for example, Robin Williams has noted that 
“to dismiss ethnicity as false consciousness 
ignores the clear evidence that ethnies often 
sacrifice economic interests in favour of sym-
bolic gains” (1994:64-65). Even beyond this, 
economic gain is not all that is sacrificed for 
as Ronaldo Munck reminds us, “nationalism 
matters because people die for it.” And, “If 
people are prepared to die for their country, 
then this must be a phenomenon worth in-
vestigating” (1986:2). The class reductionism 
of orthodox Marxism must therefore be gu-
arded against, for at different times some pe-
oples and groups will value the symbolic and 
cultural aspects of group identity higher than 
the rationally calculated, economic and poli-
tical gains to be derived (or lost) from pursu-
ing class interests. 
On the other hand, as will be seen pre-
sently, while the concept of ‘false consciousness’ 
generally is fraught with difficulty, it cannot be 
entirely ignored in any assessment of the poli-
tical calculations of specific actors, especially 
when those calculations relate to claims of et-
hnic belonging. In other words, what to some 
may appear as false consciousness, to others 
will represent strategic, rational calculation. It 
all depends on the situation at hand, and the 
long-term and short-term goals and class in-
terests of the leading actors. In what follows 
I will flesh out the concept of false conscious-
ness as it speaks to social classes, with a view 
later to applying it to an under standing of eth-
nic and national consciousness.
 73
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2008/2 (22), ISSN 1392-3358 Nacionalizmo sociologija
3. Class Consciousness and False  
Consciousness
When discussing class and class cons-
ciousness Marx was keen to point out that 
classes, and the proletariat in particular, are 
not always aware of their potential power. As 
the capitalist mode of production came to 
supplant feudal social relations in the coun-
trysides of Europe, large masses of displaced 
and dispossessed rural dwellers came under 
the sway of capital, and the beginnings of a 
proletarian class could be detected. But lac-
king political organization and education 
in any given country, members of this class 
were not automatically or spontaneously uni-
ted and conscious of their collective strength 
and possibilities. They amounted to what was 
basically a statistical aggregate, a group of 
workers brought together merely by the fact 
of their common subjugation by capital. For 
this reason they constituted what some have 
termed a class in itself. In time, however, as 
greater exposure to capitalist exploitation 
sharpened the contradictions between this 
class and the owners of capital, as their orga-
nization and education grew, so too did their 
consciousness of themselves as a class that fa-
ced a set of common problems. In the process 
there also developed the awareness of the fact 
that they could do something to better their 
conditions of existence, but this necessitated 
the collective action of a class for itself. In 
Marx’s words:
The combination of capital has created for this 
mass a common situation, common interests. 
This mass is thus already a class as against ca-
pital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle ... this 
mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a 
class for itself. The interests it defends become 
class interests (Marx 1963:173; my emphasis).
This said, what is the definition of false 
consciousness, and how is it related to the 
themes that will be pursued in the following 
pages? Before answering this question I must 
underscore the point that in a class-reductio-
nist sense, where actors are seen generally to 
lack agency, I find orthodox Marxism to be 
incomplete as an explanation for political be-
haviour in modern society. However, though 
incomplete, the insights of the orthodox posi-
tion cannot be entirely dismissed. What I will 
do, therefore, is to utilize those insights as 
they are relevant and, where necessary, I will 
provide a critique of them.
Although the specific term ‘false cons-
ciousness’ was never used by Marx, there are 
many allusions to the term in Marx’s work, 
and within the Marxist literature generally, it 
is quite commonly encountered in analyses of 
such phenomena as class consciousness, re-
volution, and ideology. As argued above, class 
consciousness or class awareness, speaks to 
the notion that a social class is made up of 
individuals who share a set of common inte-
rests, are politically aware of this fact, and are 
indeed capable of acting together to promo-
te and defend those common interests. False 
consciousness, conversely, describes a situati-
on in which individuals who share that com-
mon class situation are not aware of the fact, 
and as a consequence are not able to conceive 
of acting in concert to pursue their interests. 
As George Ritzer has written: 
The ideas of class consciousness and false 
consciousness are closely related in Marx’s 
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work. Both refer to idea systems shared by 
social classes. In capitalism both capitalists 
and workers have incorrect assessments of 
how the system works and of their role and 
interest in it (false consciousness).... What 
is characteristic of capitalism, for both the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie, is false cons-
ciousness (1992:172).
Though correct, Ritzer’s contribution 
is not original, for given the structure and 
conditions of capitalist exploitation, Georg 
Lukács earlier had reminded us that both the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat are subject to 
false consciousness. The main difference is 
that bourgeois class consciousness leads to 
false consciousness because the bourgeoisie 
is unable to see beyond capitalism as a sys-
tem, and end up by creating the conditions 
for their own demise as a class: “the barrier 
which converts the class consciousness of 
the bourgeoisie into ‘false’ consciousness is 
objective; the class situation itself ” (Lukács 
1971:54). To which might be added Marx 
and Engels’ forecast that: “What the bour-
geoisie therefore produces, above all, are its 
own gravediggers. Its fall and the victory of 
the proletariat are equally inevitable” (Marx 
and Engels 1955:22). Stated differently, the 
bourgeoisie is incapable of solving the crises 
of capitalism for it is locked into a logic of 
exploitation and accumulation that produces 
increasingly unmanageable economic crises 
(e.g. overproduction and underconsumpti-
on), that in turn condition the development 
of opposition political consciousness within 
the proletariat. The vision of the bourgeoisie 
thus “becomes obscured as soon as it is called 
upon to face problems that remain within its 
jurisdiction but which point beyond the li-
mits of capitalism” (Lukács 1971:54). 
On the other hand, the sheer survival of 
the proletariat as a class presents us with an 
instructive contradiction whereby it is com-
pelled to envision an alternative to capitalism. 
And that alternative, which is supposedly 
socialism, will see the disappearance of the 
proletariat qua proletariat. This notwithstan-
ding, Lukács writes that “the protracted death 
struggle of the bourgeoisie” is dialectically 
related to the fact that “only the conscious-
ness of the proletariat can point to the way 
that leads out of the impasse of capitalism” 
(Ibid:68, 76). Following this logic Ritzer is 
able to claim that, “The bourgeoisie can ne-
ver transform its false consciousness into true 
class consciousness; this is possible only for 
the proletariat” (1992:173). The idea here is 
that, in calling the proletariat into existence, 
the bourgeoisie unwittingly sows the seeds of 
its own destruction; but the dilemma is sys-
temic and lies beyond the reach of individual 
actors or the capitalist class as a whole.
But what about proletarian false cons-
ciousness? In The German Ideology, Marx 
and Engels acknowledged the limitations of 
reductionism and mechanical thinking when 
they wrote that, “...man also possesses ‘cons-
ciousness’,” but owing to the dominance of 
bourgeois ideology and the vicissitudes of 
daily living, it is “not inherent, not ‘pure’ cons-
ciousness” (1947:19). In other words, rather 
than romanticizing the worker as an always-
conscious and informed revolutionary actor, 
Marx and Engels understood the power and 
pervasiveness of bourgeois ideology and the 
practical difficulties that militated against ef-
fective proletarian political education and the 
development of class consciousness. 
 75
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2008/2 (22), ISSN 1392-3358 Nacionalizmo sociologija
Given the exploitive, oppressive and alie-
nating conditions under which the worker is 
forced to live and work, and speaking speci-
fically of the relationship between ideology, 
consciousness and political action, Engels 
was led to write the following in a letter to 
Franz Mehring in 1893: “Ideology is a process 
accomplished by the so-called thinker consci-
ously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. 
The real motive forces compelling him remain 
unknown to him; otherwise it simply would 
not be an ideological process” (1977:496). 
What he is suggesting is that workers, even 
the most exploited, who are often steeped in 
the bourgeois ideologies of individualism and 
materialism, are not to be expected automati-
cally to develop a critical class understanding 
their difficult life circumstances. In addition, 
what objectively might be in the best long-
term interests of the worker (e.g., joining a 
labour union), might be resisted out of fear of 
losing his or her job, or rejected in favour of 
a course of individual action (e.g., snitching 
to the boss), that is tailored more to his or 
her immediate or short-term interests: job 
security. This example of what is supposedly 
false consciousness points up the question of 
rationality and the fact that what may be seen 
as an appropriate and rational decision in the 
short-term, may in the fullness of time just 
turn out to have been wrong.
Because human beings are subjective 
beings who are subjectively involved in their 
worlds, their apprehensions of those worlds 
are understandably ideologically formed. This 
means that any talk about the existence of 
‘objectivity’ or an ‘objective reality’ is bound 
to be itself ideological. So, to speak of consci-
ousness as somehow ‘false’ begs the question 
of what ‘true’ consciousness is, and how one 
might go about discovering it. This means 
that class consciousness and false consci-
ousness are matters of subjective imputation, 
which led Georg Lukács to observe that:
It must not be thought, however, that all 
classes ripe for hegemony have a class cons-
ciousness with the same inner structure. 
Everything hinges on the extent to which they 
can become conscious of the actions they need 
to perform in order to obtain and organize 
power. The question then becomes: how far 
does the class concerned perform the actions 
that history has imposed on it ‘consciously’ 
or ‘unconsciously’? And is that consciousness 
‘true’ or ‘false’(Lukács 1971:53).
Although he was roughly of the same 
mind as Marx and Engels on the question of 
false consciousness, Lenin was even less inc-
lined to romanticize the revolutionary poten-
tial of the proletariat. Indeed, talking about 
ideology and political action, he was opposed 
to seeing the working class as specially endo-
wed with a ‘spontaneous,’ proletarian, revolu-
tionary consciousness. For him consciousness 
was created, not given. It was the culmination 
of a period of education and struggle, for the 
the working class was so dominated by bour-
geois ideology that it could not be expected 
automatically, naturally or spontaneously to 
develop a revolutionary consciousness. Equ-
ating working class revolutionary conscious-
ness with socialist consciousness, Lenin was 
in full agreement with Karl Kautsky whom he 
quotes as follows in What is to be done?:
... socialist consciousness is something intro-
duced into the proletarian class struggle from 
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without and not something that arose within it 
spontaneously .... the task of Social Democra-
cy is to imbue the proletariat [literally: saturate 
the proletariat] with the consciousness of its 
position and the consciousness of its task 
(1969:40). 
Then Lenin goes on to add his own views 
to the effect that trade union consciousness 
amounted to false consciousness. For what 
trade unions encouraged was a narrow econo-
mism according to which workers focussed 
entirely on their local, individual, material 
interests and in the process lost sight totally 
of the wider class struggle for socialism and 
proletarian internationalism. Thus, he writes: 
“Since there can be no talk of an independ-
ent ideology formulated by the working mas-
ses themselves .... the only choice is – either 
bourgeois or socialist ideology....trade unio-
nism means the ideological enslavement 
of the workers by the bourgeoisie” (Lenin 
1969:40-41). In sum, then, false conscious-
ness is a thorny term, but if carefully nuanced, 
will nevertheless prove useful for my analysis 
of ethnic nationalism, the motives that impel 
ethnic entrepreneurs (Allahar 2004), and the 
class interests that underlie “the activism of 
Third World leaders bent on inventing na-
tions where they do not exist, and engaged in 
the project of constructing the nation-to-be” 
(Smith 1988:6).
4. Ethnic Nationalism
My definition of the term ‘ethnic’ in-
cludes the notion of identity and is borrowed 
in part from Anthony Smith, for whom an 
ethnic community, or ethnie, is “a named hu-
man population possessing a myth of com-
mon descent, common historical memories, 
elements of shared culture, an association 
with a particular territory, and a sense of soli-
darity” (Smith 1988:9). To this extent it is well 
known that myth is a crucial element in ce-
menting national unity. Take for example, the 
recounting of history in the post-indepen-
dence (1991) case of Ukraine as compared 
with that of Belarus. The determination to 
write the history of Ukraine and Belarus from 
a Ukrainian and Belarusian perspective was 
intimately tied to the need for (re)discovering 
or inventing one’s history, tra ditions and 
myths. Thus, in the specific case of Ukraine 
the struggle to (re)claim the legacy of the 
medieval state of Kyiv Rus was a project given 
over to historians and historiographers, who 
have sought to enhance the national mytho-
logy and to give ethnic Ukrainians a marker 
by which to root or to anchor their ethnic 
identity (Kuzio 2006). The process of national 
re-building in Belarus, on the other hand, 
was somewhat different owing to the fact that 
“Belarus had little mythology as an indepen-
dent nation to draw upon” (Kuzio and Nord-
berg1999:72). 
Related to the question of myth in the 
formation of national identity is the idea of 
‘situational ethnicity,’ which sees ethnic iden-
tity as “incipient, problematic, and situation-
ally determined” (Nagel and Olzak 1982:129), 
and which implies that, since not all ethnic 
groups are politically mobilized at all times, 
ethnic mobilization is a calculated, rational re-
sponse to the challenges faced by some ethnic 
groups at historically specific times. As will be 
suggested, the recent concerns among cultural 
nationalists with ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia, 
 77
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2008/2 (22), ISSN 1392-3358 Nacionalizmo sociologija
Serbia, Chechenia, in Rwanda and Burundi, 
and with establishing purity of African and 
Indian roots among various Caribbean popu-
lations are cases in point (Allahar 2004). This 
said, I will understand (ethnic) nationalism as 
an ideological claim, or a movement seeking 
to make such a claim, of self-determination 
and sovereignty. Integral to this statement is 
(a) the existence of some bounded territory or 
‘nation’ over which nationalists already have 
jurisdiction and are able to maintain it, or (b) 
in the case of a nationalist movement, some 
bounded territory over which members wish 
to claim jurisdiction.
The emphasis on ‘territory’ as an im-
portant dimension of ethno-national unity 
can be seen in the example of Central Asia 
following the demise of the Soviet Union. 
For apart from the historical processes of mi-
gration, one of the main reasons for today’s 
conflicts in that region is to be traced back 
to the Soviet Union and the frequent inter-
ference with borders that led to a situation 
where many of the various ethnic groups that 
historically inhabited the region are scattered 
across areas that were not formerly their own. 
As a consequence to date there are at least 
10 disputed territories in the wider region as 
ethnic sentiments have been reawakened and 
leaders of ethnic movements have come to 
the fore to fan the flames of ethnic insecurity 
and ethnic uprooting.
5. A working definition
In an attempt to deal analytically with the 
density of the concept of nationalism scholars 
have spoken of two broad types: (a) modern 
civic or territorial nationalism, where the na-
tion is legally or juridically defined, and con-
tains clear class elements and (b) a more tra-
ditional ethnic or genealogical nationalism, 
where the nation is more ethnically and cul-
turally defined (Calhoun 1993:221). The civic 
definition sees territory as central but adds a 
common economy, common laws that apply 
equally to all citizens, a public mass educa-
tional system, shared administrative and mi-
litary institutions, and a single civic ideology 
(Smith 1988:9). The latter will include such 
charged political symbols as a national flag, a 
national anthem, a national coat-of-arms and 
a set of national holidays. Deciding on which 
of these will represent the nation is potential-
ly a matter of intense and continuing political 
debate among co-nationals, especially in the 
case of a multiethnic nation-state, whether al-
ready formed or in the process of formation. 
As a mode of political being, civic na-
tionalism was expected to be more prevalent 
in those nation states such as are encountered 
in post-colonial and post-independence Eas-
tern Europe and the Caribbean. And it is the 
fact of their multi-ethnic make-up that ren-
ders the debate over ethno-national identity 
so intense and at times so acrimonious, for, 
masked by emotive claims of ethnic entrepre-
neurs, the class dimensions of civic national-
ism often shade into and become complica-
ted by the re-awakened ethnic consciousness 
so characteristic of modern society. Thus 
viewed, ethnic nationalism, both historically 
and today, is to be found where ethnic groups 
assert themselves as nations (e.g. the Nation 
of Islam in the US or the First Nations in Ca-
nada), or else where they are in the process of 
reasserting national status. Once more the ex-
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ample of Eastern Slavic nationalisms come to 
mind as one tries to make sense of the ques-
tion of national identity and nationalism in 
the context of politics and history in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
Thus, in examining the three Eastern 
Slavic peoples known as Russians, Ukrainians 
and Belarusians political analysts have paid 
much attention to the issue of ethnic recog-
nition. Given the power and the imperialistic 
motives of the Russians, during the period of 
the USSR leading politicians steadfastly re-
fused to regard the Ukraine and Belarus as for-
eign countries with separate ethnic identities. 
Thus, Kuzio (2006) tells us, in the writing of 
the history of the region the Russophile (Rus-
sian imperial) and Sovietophile (Soviet) ver-
sions were always dominant and they treated 
Ukraine and Belarus largely as appendages of 
Russia. Indeed, any talk of Ukrainian inde-
pendence was seen by Sovietophile histori-
ans as ‘unnatural’ for nature had decreed that 
the country was naturally part of the Russian 
union (2006:408). In the post-independence 
era, however, an Eastern Slavic and Ukraino-
phile (Ukrainian national) historiography has 
sought to set the record straight by according 
Ukraine and Belarus the roles of independent 
actors on the historical stage.
So, similar to the Greek usage described 
earlier, my understanding of the term ‘ethnic’ 
is closely bound up with that of ‘nation;’ and 
‘ethnic’ is meant to designate those groups 
that experience a distinct sense of we-ness, or 
what can be called nation-ness, that claim a 
common history, a common line of ancestral 
descent, and a common culture complete with 
a set of common customs and unifying myths. 
While it is generally felt that civic nationalism 
is more modern and grew out of this earlier 
form of ethno-cultural nationalism, the con-
temporary politics of ethnic nationalism in 
the Caribbean and the former Soviet Union 
suggests, if not the reverse, at least a return to 
the earlier form of group identification.
Ethnic nationalism, then, is to be found 
in situations where a discrete ethnic group 
lays claim to a national identity and patri-
mony that (a) separates it from other groups, 
ethnic or non-ethnic, and (b) has in mind a 
clear territorial base. Given the above dis-
cussion of civic nationalism, it goes without 
saying that not all nationalism is ethnically 
driven, for there are numerous examples of 
multi-ethnic nations or multi-ethnic states 
in which class forms the basis for nationalist 
appeals. Therefore, any comprehensive defin-
ition of nationalism will have to include both 
the civic and ethnic dimensions of the phe-
nomenon. Caught up in the dislocating eco-
nomics and politics of globalization, certain 
countries in the former USSR, for example, 
Ukraine, Georgia and even in the Caucasus 
region and the contemporary Caribbean, 
evince a fluid back-and-forth movement be-
tween the two approaches to nationalism, as 
various ethnic entrepreneurs attempt to cap-
italize on the peoples’ general sense of cul-
tural uprootedness and dislocation. As will be 
seen presently, the entrepreneurs in question 
are not averse to excavating (their invented 
version of) history with a view to mobilizing 
specific ethnic groups for political ends: 
The aim is to present a vivid, archaeologically 
faithful and comprehensive record of the na-
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tion from the dawn of its existence until the 
present in a convincing and dramatic narrative 
form, which will inspire members of the ethnie 
to return to ancestral ways and ideals, and 
mobilise them to create on its basis a modern 
nation, or, in nationalist language, ‘reawaken 
the nation’ (Smith 1988:13).
Viewed in this way, the overall process 
of mobilization involves a reciprocity betwe-
en the two approaches to nationalism whe-
reby both appear to be mutually reinforcing 
as ethnic groups compete for the right to 
(re)name or (re)define the juridical nation. 
And when parties to the competition are of 
roughly equal power and resources, refusal to 
yield or compromise will tend to result in se-
paratism or ethnic strife.
The foregoing is related to one additional 
matter which concerns the idea of territory or 
the ‘home’ in ‘homeland.’ As Harold Isaacs 
charges: “Territory has a critical role to play 
in maintaining group separateness; without it 
a ‘nationality’ has difficulty becoming a ‘na-
tion’ and a ‘nation’ cannot become a state” 
(1975:53). This is particularly important in 
the modern age of globalization, diasporas, 
long distance travel, and mass migrations, 
and is intimately bound up with the politics 
of identity and belonging. For whether one 
is driven out of one’s homeland as a slave, an 
indentured worker, a political refugee, or for 
reasons of economic hardship, or simply for 
purposes of family reunification, diasporic 
politics and the nostalgic imaginings of home 
from abroad are crucial elements in the ter-
ritorial aspects of identity and belonging to 
a homeland. What we do know, however, is 
that even those communities that have lost 
their homelands through colonial or impe-
rial conquest, war, migration and so on, will 
continue to root themselves in the world by 
reference, even spiritually, to that (imagined) 
homeland.
6. Marxism and Nationalism
Of the various attempts to deal analy-
tically with the vexing question of nationa-
lism, I have found the work of neo-Marxists 
to be the most sophisticated and instructive. 
Among them, however, there is no automa-
tic, agreed-upon consensus. Thus, as a neo-
Marxist, when Tom Nairn wrote: “The theory 
of nationalism represents Marxism’s great 
historical failure” (1975:3), he was echoing 
the sentiments of many like-minded others, 
who were caught off-guard by the persistence 
of nationalist and ethnic identity allegiance 
right into the modern era of global capitalism. 
But Marxists were not the only ones guilty of 
this shortcoming, for functionalists, moder-
nization and dependency theorists, among 
many others, were convinced that the social 
identities of clan, tribe, village, ethnicity and 
nation would not survive into the modern pe-
riod. The exigencies of modern living, indus-
trialization, secularization, urbanization, the 
destruction of traditional community and the 
‘freeing’ of the individual, were all expected 
to dictate a more rational approach to identi-
ty and survival. Life in a thriving and bustling 
metropolitan setting, it was felt, would be ba-
sed more on one’s occupational and economic 
position than one’s membership in a tribe, 
clan, family or ethnic group. Indeed, all the 
other non-class forms of identity and aware-
80
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2008/2 (22), ISSN 1392-3358 Nacionalizmo sociologija
ness, particularly the ethnic and nationalist 
ones, were felt by Marxists to constitute epi-
phenomena – a false consciousness; to be dis-
tractions from the true realization of the roots 
of class (economic) exploitation and political 
disenfranchisement (Campbell 1972:5-6).
Given Marx and Engels’ political and 
ideological commitment to socialism and the 
politics of class struggle, it is not difficult to 
understand why they would have downplayed 
the questions of ethnic and national consci-
ousness. But as the historical record demons-
trates, even if the above-noted expectations 
may have been warranted in their time, world 
events over the past 100 years have proven 
them wrong. Benedict Anderson says it well: 
“...the ‘end of the era of nationalism,’ so long 
prophesied, is not remotely in sight. In deed, 
nation-ness is the most universally legiti-
mate value in the political life of our time” 
(1983:12). As we know, the processes of colo-
nization, slavery, imperialism and globalizati-
on have done more to keep global ethnic and 
national consciousness alive than Marx and 
Engels ever could have predicted. Fur ther, 
because their political vision was internatio-
nalist (Munck 1986:3), it is understandable 
that Marx and Engels would have been oppo-
sed to nationalism. The final sentence of The 
Communist Manifesto is clear in its exhorta-
tion: “Workingmen of all countries, unite!” 
(1955:46; my emphasis). 
This exhortation was based on their view 
that the development of capitalism would in-
ternationalize exploitation and thereby elimi-
nate the national differences among the pro-
letariats of various countries. On this basis 
they claimed that “the workingmen have no 
country,” for “National differences and an-
tagonisms between peoples are vanishing... 
owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, 
to freedom of commerce, to the world mar-
ket, to uniformity in the mode of producti-
on...” (Ibid:29). Their point was not so much 
that working men (and women) had lost their 
countries to the forces of capitalism and im-
perialism, but rather that the historic role of 
the proletariat was one of international soli-
darity against the forces of imperialism. 
In the estimation of Marx and Engels the 
proletarian struggle was aimed at securing 
world socialism, not at the national libera tion 
of a single country or group of countries. For 
this reason nationalist consciousness appeared 
to them as divisive of the international prole-
tarian solidarity in struggle, as false consci-
ousness, and they tended to ignore it. As V.G. 
Kiernan has noted: “...nationality in itself was 
not a theme that greatly interested them; they 
looked forward to its speedy demise, and in 
the meantime were far more concerned with 
its component elements, social classes.” And: 
“Nationalism is a subject on which Marx and 
Engels are commonly felt to have gone astray, 
most markedly in their earlier years, by great-
ly underestimating a force which was about to 
grow explosively” (1983:344; 346).
This point was picked up by Marxists like 
Lenin and Stalin and those neo-Marxists who 
followed them. For by the turn of the 20th cen-
tury, when imperialism, as the highest stage of 
capitalism, became manifest, movements for 
national liberation in Europe showed that: “...
where a straightforward struggle against im-
perialism was being waged, fusion or linkage 
of socialism with nationalism won many suc-
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cesses” (Kiernan 1983:349). Thus, throughout 
the remainder of that century there was an 
uneasy, very tenuous alliance between those 
nationalist movements that waged wars of 
national liberation and those Marxist move-
ments that struggled for socialism. But the 
stand-off was not as black-and-white as many 
have made it out to be; for despite their in-
ternationalist politics, Marx and Engels did 
acknowledge that the struggle for socialism is 
more practically waged in the first instance at 
the national level: “the struggle of the proleta-
riat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national 
struggle. The proletariat of each country must, 
of course, first of all settle matters with its 
own bourgeoisie” (Marx and Engels 1955:21). 
This is a very important point to underscore, 
particularly because ideo logical opponents 
of Marxism are so quick to distort the record 
and claim, as Ronaldo Munck does, that “Es-
sentially, Marxism has no theory of nationa-
lism” (1986:2). Hence, though aware of the 
limitations and distractions of nationalist 
consciousness, Marx and Engels recognized 
the need to incorporate some consideration 
of that consciousness as part of the process of 
the larger struggle for socialism. How, then, 
does the so-called national question become 
articulated with the ethnic dimension of the 
struggle for emancipation in multi-ethnic, 
post-colonial settings such as the former So-
viet republics and the Caribbean?
7. Class and Nationalism
Regarding the class aspects of nationa-
lism, and in the specific context of the Carib-
bean, I want to offer some more theoretical 
observations and suggest three ideal-types of 
class-bound nationalism: (a) bourgeois natio-
nalism; (b) petty-bourgeois nationalism; and 
(c) popular or working-class nationalism. The 
key questions in each of these is: which class 
gets to name or define the nation? Which 
class’ vision and values will prevail in that de-
finition?
The first example of nationalism, bourge-
ois nationalism, is the type with which we are 
most familiar. It encompasses the kind of ap-
peal that the capitalist class in Europe made 
early in the development and consolidation 
of national economies and the identification 
of national boundaries. This type of nationa-
lism is very effective in fostering false consci-
ousness and distracting the middle- and wor-
king-classes from a clear understanding of 
their economic and political exploitation and 
disenfranchisement. It suggests that natio-
nal allegiance and devotion, from which the 
bourgeoisie stands to benefit, are paramount 
and represent the only viable route to soverei-
gnity, security, national unity and prosperity.
As a political ideology, bourgeois natio-
nalism works hand-in-hand with capitalism 
and liberalism, which seek to portray the 
private concerns of the bourgeoisie, rationa-
lization of business practices, bureaucratic 
efficiency and the securing of huge profits, 
as benefiting the nation as a whole. Even in 
those cases where rationalism and efficiency 
demand downsizing, out-sourcing, job losses 
and worker dislocation, bourgeois nationa-
lists tout these as ‘natural’ occurrences in any 
healthy economy. The class vision of bour-
geois nationalists is one which understands 
the nation and its wealth as belonging to the 
bourgeoisie, and although some concessions 
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have to be made to other social class fractions 
and groups along the way, in the final analysis 
the lion’s share of the political and economic 
spoils belongs to their class. Thus conceived, 
bourgeois nationalism sprang from Europe-
an capitalism and the various wars of the 18th 
and 19th centuries that were aimed at nation 
building on that continent. In the process, 
as European capitalism spread across natio-
nal boundaries to encompass new lands and 
continents, especially the Americas, it conso-
lidated itself in the practices of colonialism, 
imperialism and globalization, giving birth 
to today’s imperialist bourgeoisie, which has 
such a direct hand in the moulding of natio-
nalisms in the rest of the (developing) world. 
Curiously, with the world as its economic pla-
yground, the imperialist bourgeoisie is more 
internationalist than nationalist, for interna-
tionalism today is a defining feature of glo-
balization and neo-liberalism. Thus, whereas 
Marx and Engels clearly favoured the idea of 
‘internationalism’ as it spoke to the proleta-
riat, they clearly opposed the bourgeois ver-
sion of such internationalism.
The second type of nationalism, petty-
bourgeois nationalism, is, as the name sug-
gests. It is a form of bourgeois nationalism 
albeit on a somewhat smaller (petit or petty) 
scale. Of course it is not possible to quanti-
fy nationalism per se, so what do I mean by 
‘smaller scale’? Quite simply, petty-bourgeois 
nationalism in this usage speaks to the scale 
of surplus value appropriation of the petty-
bourgeoisie relative to the scale of bourgeois 
appropriation. For example, whereas in eco-
nomic matters one fraction of the bourgeoisie 
will favour policies of free trade in those areas 
where it has comparative advantage, the pet-
ty-bourgeoisie is more traditionally in favour 
of protectionism. Unable to compete interna-
tionally, the petty-bourgeoisie’s scale of ope-
rations is restricted to the local market, and to 
the extent that they make nationalist appeals, 
those are aimed at promoting and protecting 
their specific spheres of operation: local in-
dustry, local manufacturing, and the exchan-
ge of locally-produced goods and services. To 
this end the petty-bourgeoisie is also keen, to 
the extent it is possible, to have control of, or 
input into the post-colonial state, where de-
cisions governing the operations of the local 
economy are taken. 
So whereas there exists a petty-bour-
geoisie in the countries of advanced capi-
talism, I wish to call attention to the petty-
bourgeoisie in the so-called Third World or 
developing countries, and the attempts of 
the latter to define the nation politically and 
economically. Understanding the position 
of the Third World petty-bourgeoisie is very 
complex owing to the fact that some scholars 
use the term ‘petty-bourgeoisie’ to refer to 
the class fraction that has political control of 
the post-colonial political order and the sta-
te (Fanon 1963; Sudama 1983; Dupuy 1991), 
while others focus on the Third World pet-
ty-bourgeoisie as a class that is economically 
subordinated to the imperialist bourgeoisie 
(Frank 1972; Chirot 1977; 1986). In the pre-
sent context I will treat the petty-bourgeoisie 
as a single class with distinct economic and 
political fractions, that are also given to intra-
bourgeois conflicts at specific moments. 
I am thus in agreement with Trevor Su-
dama, when he wrote that “the petty-bour-
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geoisie emerged as a class in the pursuit of 
control over the post colonial state appara-
tus” (1983:77), but at the same time this class 
was limited to the role of junior partner of 
the imperialist bourgeoisie. For this reason, 
whether in its political or economic guise, 
petty-bourgeois nationalism contains no cri-
tique of capitalism, is generally reformist, and 
seeks mainly to accommodate the interests 
of the imperialist bourgeoisie. This means 
that petty-bourgeois nationalism is guided 
by the clear class goal of securing a space for 
its own economic and political manoeuvers 
in bet ween the imperialist bourgeoisie and 
the working classes. To this extent the petty-
bour geoisie is a class that has had different 
names, some of which are not too flattering. 
André Gunder Frank (1972) called it the 
“lumpenbourgeoisie,” while Frantz Fanon, 
who saw it as a “national bourgeoisie,” felt ne-
vertheless that its behaviour was that “of a tra-
ditional bourgeoisie, of a bourgeoisie which 
is stupidly, contemptibly, cynically bourgeois” 
(1963:150). 
Alex Dupuy has dubbed the political 
fraction of this class a managerial bourgeoisie 
given the fact of its control of the post-colo-
nial state, and that in exercising state control 
it is answerable to the will of the internatio-
nal corporate bourgeoisie (Dupuy 1991:75). 
Because the economic wealth of Third World 
countries is largely owned and controlled 
by the international corporate (imperialist) 
bourgeoisie, access to power and privile-
ge among local classes is seen to come from 
cont rol of the local state apparatus, for this is 
the most promising avenue to power, prestige, 
personal enrichment and privilege via graft, 
corruption, and other less-than-legal means. 
On penalty of removal from power, and as ju-
nior partners of the imperialist bourgeoisie, 
members of this class are obliged to do the 
bidding of the latter.
Understood in this way, the Third World 
petty-bourgeoisie can be seen to comprise 
two separate class fractions. The first fraction 
discussed above can be described, not as na-
tional, but as anti-national, in that its policies 
are geared to servicing the interests of the im-
perialist bourgeoisie, and are not designed to 
promote truly national or indigenous develo-
pment of local industry and manufacturing, 
and the infrastructure that accompanies such 
processes. Writing about post-independence 
Trinidad and Tobago, Sudama notes that this 
class fraction: “hardly ever took an indepen-
dent position on any question.” It contented 
itself with “the knowledge that the chosen 
path of capitalist development and the domi-
nant influence of the international bourgeoi-
sie guaranteed conditions for the pursuit of 
its economic interests (1983:80).
The second take on the Third World 
petty-bourgeoisie is related to the presence 
of another important set of local economic 
actors. I am referring to what Chilcote and 
Edelstein (1974:735) among others label the 
comprador bourgeoisie. Compared to the 
other fraction of this class, the comprador 
bourgeoisie is smaller and weaker, and has 
a clear interest, not in cooperating with the 
imperialist bourgeoisie, but in lessening the 
country’s degree of dependence on the latter. 
Therefore, following the logic of my argu-
ment, I dub this fraction the patriotic national 
bourgeoisie. For whether as large landowners, 
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local manufacturers, merchants and traders, 
or even financiers, this fraction of the bour-
geoisie is one that is said to pursue policies 
that, though bourgeois, are more concerned 
with harnessing the indigenous resources for 
local industrial growth and development. The 
activities of this class, which, in strictly local-
national terms “owns the means of produc-
tion of industrial goods, and whose interests 
are, as a consequence, opposed to those of fo-
reign capital” (Torres Rivas 1977:39), are also 
concentrated in the areas of small business, 
banking, transportation, insurance, real esta-
te, legal and accounting services. Its indust-
rial policies are largely those of protectionism, 
which serve to shelter locally nascent indus-
trial, manufacturing and service operations 
from ruinous foreign competition.
Compared to the anti-national fraction 
of this bourgeoisie, which benefits from the 
partial freeing of trade, and which is prima-
rily interested in the export of non-processed 
or unfinished raw materials, this latter frac-
tion is seen to act more as a national, in the 
patriotic sense of the word, bourgeoisie (Alla-
har 1990:227-235). It is not that this patriotic 
petty-bourgeoisie is somehow more virtuous 
than the anti-national or even the imperialist 
bourgeoisie. It just so happens that its class 
interests do not go as clearly and as imme-
diately counter to the interests of the Third 
World nation in question. Given its struc-
turally antagonistic position vis-à-vis the 
imperialist and anti-national bourgeoisies, 
the patriotic petty-bourgeoisie is likely to be 
more progressive, but can be expected to stop 
short of calling for socialism and the genui-
ne nationalization of the country’s means of 
production. Analytically then, it is important 
to make a distinction between the political 
and economic arms of lumpendevelopment. 
The class fraction that has political control of 
the state in the post-colonial order, is separate 
from the local economic actors who control 
commerce and the entire agro-export indus-
try, but who are subject to the laws enacted by 
the former fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie 
in control of the state. 
In a region such as the post-indepen-
dence, English-speaking Caribbean, the poli-
tical fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie is com-
posed of the intellectuals, who were groomed 
by the colonizers, and later by the imperialist 
bourgeoisie, to assume state power after the 
latters’ departure from the colony. They were 
often educated in the universities of the colo-
nizers and former colonizers, steeped in the 
latter’s political culture and values, and as a 
consequence their political campaigns were, 
and continue to be funded, both directly and 
indirectly, by foreign interests. Writing on 
the eve of independence in 1961 C.L.R. Ja-
mes referred to this group collectively as “the 
West Indian middle classes” and as “political 
nouveaux-riches,” whose “ignorance and dis-
regard of economic development is profound 
and deeply rooted in their past and present 
situation. They do not even seem to be awa-
re of it... I do not know of any social class 
which lives so completely without ideas any 
kind” (1980:131-134). And half a century la-
ter not much has changed. For once elected, 
this petty-bourgeois class of political leaders, 
the ones who are put in power to carry on 
the business of the colonialist and imperialist 
bourgeoisies, are also able to call upon poli-
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tically and ideologically sympathetic foreign 
states to provide military support and protec-
tion whenever threats to their continued rule, 
actual or perceived, might arise locally. On 
this score James’ critique of this class, though 
almost 50 years ago, is still generally appli-
cable: “They seem to aim at nothing more 
than being second-rate American citizens....
They are dying to find some communists 
against whom they can thunder and so make 
an easier road to American pockets” (James 
1980:134).
This is also the class described by Frantz 
Fanon variously as “the national bourgeoisie” 
or “the national middle class” (Fanon 1963). 
And speaking of this class, one of Fanon’s fo-
remost interpreters, Irene Gendzier, writes of 
“the inability of the bourgeoisie to act in the 
national interests” and as exhibiting “a total 
indifference to the needs of the mass of the 
population; and worst of all, an economi-
cally ineffectual and pretentious minority” 
(1973:218). Generally speaking, neither the 
political nor the economic fractions of the 
local petty-bourgeoisies in the post-indepen-
dence Caribbean countries is either revolu-
tionary or nationalist in the genuine sense 
of the term, for their principal mandate is 
to preserve the conditions for the expanded 
reproduction and accumulation of capital. 
And capitalism has not shown itself to have 
the interests of the masses of any single coun-
try, let alone the masses of the world, at heart 
(Allahar 1995:127). In other words, because 
the lea ders of these countries are committed 
to the retention of capitalism, and even if at 
times they have been known to espouse a 
populist rhetoric aimed at national mobiliza-
tion, the fact remains that each passing day 
bears testimony to their inability to deliver 
the goods to the people.
Finally, there is working class nationa-
lism, which in my estimation comes closest to 
a true or genuine nationalism. As the largest 
class in terms of sheer numbers, its policies 
have the potential, if only statistically, of ta-
king into account what is in the best interests 
of the majority of the nation. On this basis I 
will argue that a genuine working class natio-
na lism, as opposed to a working class na-
tionalism based on false consciousness, is a 
stepping stone to socialism!
In the same way that the bourgeoisie and 
the petty-bourgeoisie of different countries 
are able to promote and pursue class-bound 
nationalist strategies, one may also conceive 
of popular or working class nationalism. Just 
as one may speak of a capitalist state that ser-
ves principally the interests of the capitalist 
class(es), I am speaking here of nationalism 
as an ideology that informs a worker’s move-
ment bent on creating a ‘nation,’ whose poli-
cies and programs are more in tune with its 
interests. Because the interests of the bourge-
oisie and the petty-bourgeoisie do not coinci-
de exactly with those of the working class or 
the wider masses, it is possible to envisage a 
nationalist claim on the part of workers that 
goes against that of the various petty-bourge-
ois fractions. But to the extent that the wor-
king class is not homogeneous and workers 
do not all share the same politics, how is it 
possible to speak of a workers’ state that will 
pursue the interests of the working class? 
As hinted above, this is a serious issue, 
for it begs the question of whether nationa-
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list consciousness among the working class is 
false consciousness. The answer has to begin 
with the acknowledgement that while not all 
the members of the bourgeoisie or the pet-
ty-bourgeoisie as a whole will have identical 
political interests, so too, within the working 
class it is to be expected that there will be 
political differences. And this is where the 
thorny issue of false consciousness comes into 
play. Those members of the working class, 
who, for whatever reasons, do not challenge 
bour geois or petty-bourgeois definitions of 
what is in the best interest of the nation, and 
whose political stance does not include a cri-
tique of capitalism, may well be said to be suf-
fering from false consciousness. For as I have 
argued, throughout its history capitalism has 
shown itself to be inimical to the long-term 
interests of working people everywhere.
On the other hand, as long as a significant 
proportion of the class is organized, educated, 
united and conscious, and as long as they agi-
tate for a nation in which the broad interests 
of workers are protected and promoted, we 
are able to speak either of a genuine working 
class nationalism or a genuine working class 
nationalist movement. The latter is relevant in 
the context of ‘territory,’ for nations that are 
in search of homes are under standably con-
cerned with the establishment of a physical 
homeland or ‘space’ that they can call theirs: 
“Possession of territory is, after all, a sine qua 
non of statehood and an essential goal of eve-
ry nationalism” (Smith 1983:xiii). 
In sum, therefore, true working class 
nationalism is a step toward socialism, or, 
stated differently, a step toward working class 
internationalism! For it is only when the pro-
letariat “wins the battle of democracy” (Marx 
and Engels 1955:31) and establishes a socia-
list state that the interests of the working class 
as a whole can begin genuinely to be addres-
sed. This is precisely the sentiment of Marx 
and Engels as expressed in The Communist 
Manifesto: “In the national struggles of the 
proletarians of the different countries, they 
point out and bring to the front the common 
interests of the entire proletariat, indepen-
dently of all nationality” (Marx and Engels 
1955:23, my emphasis). This is also consistent 
with the argument of Anthony Smith who 
affirms that: “...nationalism is typically a po-
litical argument, a tool for seizing the state by 
mobilizing, coordinating and legitimating the 
movement of the masses” (Smith 1988:5). 
My argument, then, is that a working class 
nationalism that is not based on false consci-
ousness must in effect be internationalist in its 
vision, and this is synonymous with internatio-
nal socialism. The specifics of such a working 
class movement, however, will understandably 
have to take into consideration the practical 
conditions facing the working class or prole-
tariat in a given country, be it advanced indus-
trial or developing, and the specific socialist 
content of the policies to be implemented once 
that movement is successful.
8. Conclusion: Leadership, Class  
and Ethnic Nationalism
At this point the question of the leaders-
hip of such a movement is relevant. While the 
working class is quite capable of generating 
its own nationalist (and revolutionary) lea-
ders, and in fact has done so with regularity 
over the years and all over the world, one also 
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has to be aware of the political influence of 
conscious, non-proletarian individuals on the 
proletarian movement. A compelling case in 
point is that of Marx and Engels themselves, 
who were decidedly not from the working 
class, yet they were very cognizant of the po-
tential for change inherent in a politicized 
and class conscious proletariat that contained 
radical elements of bourgeois or petty-bour-
geois sympathizers: “...in times when the class 
struggler nears the decisive hour, the process 
of dissolution going on within the ruling class, 
... assumes a violent, glaring character” and it 
is precisely at this time that “a small section of 
the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the 
revolutionary class, the class that holds the 
future in its hands.” In other words, “a portion 
of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, 
and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois 
ideologists, who have raised themselves to 
the level of comprehending theoretically the 
historical movement as a whole” (Marx and 
Engels 1955:20). 
Lenin is in full agreement and is very 
clear not to romanticize the revolutionary 
potential of the working class as something 
that is either automatic or spontaneous. Inde-
ed, while making the case for scientific soci-
alism, he was keen to underscore the central 
role of theory, criticism and reflection in the 
process: “Without revolutionary theory there 
can be no revolutionary movement” (Lenin 
1969:25). And speaking of theory and its re-
lationship to the process of scientific analysis 
and understanding, once more he cites appro-
vingly Karl Kautsky, who argued that socialist 
consciousness can arise only on the basis of 
profound scientific knowledge:
The vehicle of science is not the proletariat, 
but the bourgeois intelligentsia: it was in the 
minds of individual members of this stratum 
that modern socialism originated, and it 
was they who communicated it to the more 
intellectually developed proletarians who, in 
their turn, introduce it into the proletarian 
class struggle .... Thus, socialist consciousness 
is something introduced into the proletarian 
class struggle from without and not something 
that arose within it spontaneously (Lenin 
1969:40).
In the Caribbean context this brings to 
mind the potential leadership role of middle 
class or petty-bourgeois intellectuals in a 
working class nationalist movement (Allahar 
2001b). It also brings to mind Tom Nairn’s 
provocative charge in the European context 
that: “The new middle-class intelligentsia of 
nationalism had to invite the masses into his-
tory...” (Nairn 1977:340). For what I want to 
suggest is that, depending on the circumstan-
ces at hand, such bourgeois or petty-bourge-
ois intellectuals may be able either to hijack 
the working class movement and harness its 
energies for their own purposes, or to pro-
vide genuine internationalist leadership. In 
other words, depending on the movement’s 
leadership and its general degree of class 
consciousness and political action, working 
class nationalism can be channelled in either 
a reactionary bourgeois, or a progressive so-
cialist direction. The former, as is often the 
case, may witness the emergence of politically 
skilled, petty-bourgeois ethnic entrepreneurs, 
who use appeals to race and ethnic solidari-
ty as distractions, and who also exploit false 
consciousness by tapping into the emotions 
of the workers and commanding their al-
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legiance. The latter, on the other hand, will 
look beyond race and ethnic differences and 
attempt to retain its class character. This will 
speak to true class consciousness and the at-
tempts by both the leadership and the rank 
and file of the movement to promote a soci-
alist alternative to dependent capitalism and 
to create possibilities for the triumph of hu-
manism and communalism over materialism, 
consumerism and individualism.
To elaborate, as an example of the first 
(false consciousness) I want to suggest a 
critical look at the politics of ethnicity and 
ethnic nationalism and the ethnic entrepre-
neurs who energize such politics. For it is my 
contention that the politics in question serve 
to promote false consciousness. My point of 
departure is a comment made by Paul Gilroy 
and directed specifically at Afrocentrism, but 
is equally applicable to other forms of ethno-
national political appeals and movements. 
First, as Gilroy writes, such (Afrocentric) 
political movements lack “even the possibili-
ty of imagining an alternative to capitalism” 
(Gilroy 2000:210), thus tying their fate to the 
fortunes of capital, and second, their spo-
kespersons are responsible for promoting a 
politics of distraction (race) within the wor-
king classes. Stated differently, my charge is 
that ethnic nationalism is a political appeal 
made by ethnic entrepreneurs who have very 
clear and narrow class and power interests at 
heart, but who, in order to realise those in-
terests, will mask them by emotional appeals 
to race, hoping thus to gain the support of as 
broad a base as possible. To secure their goal 
of mobilizing politically and emotionally a 
given population, such ethnic entrepreneurs 
play on an assumed primordial, ethno-racial 
commonality, which distracts members of the 
target population from a class understanding 
of their situation. In the process the latter are 
prevented from coming to see that the so-
called harmony of ethno-racial interests may 
well mask serious class divisions within the 
ethno-racial group in question. 
On the other hand, for my example of 
genuine working class consciousness and 
proletarian internationalism, I refer the re-
ader to socialist Cuba, complete with all 
its notable triumphs and glaring failures. I 
would also invite the reader here to separate 
the genuine problems of socialism in Cuba 
from those problems of socialism induced 
by imperialist aggression (Allahar 2001a). 
Because human beings are imperfect (that’s 
what makes them human), the social and 
political systems they create will reflect those 
imperfections. The challenge, then, is to es-
tablish priorities based on humanistic ideals, 
to assess the potential costs or consequences 
of achieving those ideals, and to strive to mi-
nimise the latter. To this I suggest that the 
imperfections of socialism are to be prefer-
red over those of (dependent) capitalism in 
the Caribbean and elsewhere.
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AbSTRACT
The present paper aims to propose a schema for analysing the contemporary politics of national and 
ethnic identity in post-colonial and post-socialist states. To this end it will seek: (a) to provide a compre-
hensive operational definition of nationalism, (b) to qualify that definition by the addition of the adjective 
‘ethnic,’ (c) to assess the extent to which the concept ‘ethnic nationalism’ can help us to understand some of 
the politics of ethnicity and national identity in a post-independence setting, and (d) to problematize the 
notion of ‘false consciousness’ in ethno-national political appeals. My argument will be situated within the 
broad theoretical framework of a non-reductionist, neo-Marxist class analysis, for it is my conviction that 
ethno-national consciousness and politics are better understood if we are able to trace the concrete class 
interests and motives of their promoters. In other words, whether as sentiment or as movement, nationa-
lism cannot be divorced from the class interests of its leading promoters. But one must be cautious when 
absolutizing the class claim, for in the specific case of ethnic nationalism, for example, Robin Williams has 
noted that “to dismiss ethnicity as false consciousness ignores the clear evidence that ethnies often sacrifice 
economic interests in favour of symbolic gains” (1994:64-65), and even beyond this, as Ronaldo Munck 
reminds us, “nationalism matters because people die for it” (1986:2).
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